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THE COURTS AND THE 1980 
CENSUS CHALLENGES: TAILORING 
RIGHTS TO FIT REMEDIES 
On December 22, 1980, a federal judge in New York City 
found that the Census Bureau's troubles in counting poor people 
and minorities had caused at least 750,000 to 900,000 people to 
be missed when the Bureau counted the state for the 1980 cen-
sus.1 The New York ruling came two months after a similar suit 
had prompted a federal judge in Detroit to order sweeping ad-
justments in the final census totals for the nation's black and 
Hispanic populations. 2 By the early months of 1981, these two 
suits had been joined by nearly fifty others, and the Supreme 
Court had been invited to face questions arising out of five of 
these cases. 3 
The 1980 census challenges involved issues that have assumed 
tremendous importance in the last two decades. Society's ap-
proach to the allocation of resources and political power depends 
fundamentally upon the census. The concerns that government 
benefits and political clout be distributed equitably throughout 
the nation have shaped the bold doctrines of the reapportion-
1. Carey v. Klutznick, 508 F. Supp 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), reu'd and remanded, 653 
F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3352 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1981)(No. 
81-752). 
2. Young v. Klutznick, 497 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Mich. 1980), reu'd, 652 F.2d 617 (6th 
Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3404 (U.S. Nov. 6, 198l)(No. 81-867). 
3. A listing of 49 census challenges appears in Carey v. Klutznick, 653 F.2d 732, 735 
n.10 (2d Cir. 1981). Of these, a suit challenging inclusion of illegal aliens in the census 
had been appealed to the Supreme Court. Federation for Am. Immigration Reform v. 
Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1980) (three-judge court), appeal dismissed, 447 
U.S. 918 (1980), aff'd per curiam, No. 80-1246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 1980), cert. denied, 101 
S. Ct. 1697 (1981) [hereinafter cited as FAIR v. Klutznick]. In addition, the New York 
and Detroit suits reached the Supreme Court after the trial ·courts had enjoined release 
of certain census figures pending the adjustment of undercounts. Klutznick v. Young, 
No. A-533 (U.S., stay granted Dec. 24, 1980), Klutznick v. Carey, 449 U.S. 1068 (stay 
granted 1980). Finally, in 1981 the Court granted certiorari in two cases involving the 
release of census data. Shapiro v. Klutznick, No. 80-2638 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 1980), aff'd 
mem., 636 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir.), stay granted, 101 S.Ct. 779 (1980), cert. granted sub nom. 
Baldridge [sic] v. Shapiro, 101 S. Ct. 2015 (1981); McNichols v. Klutznick, No. 80-C-1151 
(D. Colo. Sept. 17, 1980), reu'd, 644 F.2d 844 (10th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Mc-
Nichols v. Baldridge [sic], 101 S. Ct. 3079 (1981). 
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ment cases and the wide-ranging congressional decisions to ap-
propriate federal funds through population-based formulas. 
Considering the importance of the public values threatened by 
census undercounts, it is not surprising that the courts first 
hearing the merits of the undercount suits generally ruled in the 
challengers' favor. Even so, by the fall of 1981 not one census 
statistic had been changed, nor had any major suit remotely ap-
proached a successful conclusion. This turnabout resulted from 
unceasing Census Bureau opposition, and a series of appellate 
court rulings that appeared to eliminate any chances the plain-
tiffs might have had for success. 
At first, these appellate rulings are puzzling; their stated ratio-
nales are simply too unconvincing. As the problems involved in 
remedying census undercounts become more apparent, however, 
an ironic explanation arises for the appellate court rulings. The 
courts faced the possibility that no method of undercount ad-
justment could ultimately be def ended, either in statistical the-
ory or in constitutional doctrine. Given this situation, it seems a 
plausible hypothesis that the courts rejected the census chal-
lenges simply because they could find no viable remedy for the 
gri~vances presented. 
This Note thus presents a vivid illustration of how the recog-
nition of legal rights sometimes may depend wholly upon the ef-
ficacy of awarding relief. Parts I and II survey the 1980 census 
challenges and explore whether the 1980 litigants presented 
sound grievances. Part ill argues that the 1980 census challeng-
ers may have failed because the reviewing courts could envision 
no feasible remedies for their injuries, and not because the chal-
lengers presented flawed legal and constitutional arguments. Fi-
nally, part IV criticizes the courts for dismissing the census chal-
lenges without confronting or acknowledging the gravity of the 
constitutional injuries threatened by census undercounts. 
I. SURVEY OF THE CENSUS CHALLENGES 
Undercounts have been customary from the very beginning of 
the census. In the nation's first census in 1790, a large under-
count was suspected;' and by 1970 the number of uncounted had 
4. Special Committee on Empirical Data in Legal Decision Making, The Undercount 
of the Census, 36 REC. Ass'N BAR CITY N.Y. 23-24 (1981) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. BAR 
REPORT]. 
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reached 4.5 million.G As the April 1, 1980, census date ap-
proached, even the Census Bureau acknowledged that it would 
likely miss many people, 6 prompting both houses of Congress to 
begin hearings on the causes and effects of the possible 
undercount. 7 
In these hearings, many observers anticipated that state and 
local officials would "challenge the Census in a thousand reason-
able and unreasonable ways"8 in order to safeguard government 
funding. To forestall these challenges, the Bureau was advised to 
adjust the final 1980 figures to incorporate its own estimates of 
uncounted people.9 The Bureau, however, refused to take a posi-
tion on the issue - an approach that seemed vindicated when 
the first of the 1980 challenges, seeking to exclude illegal aliens 
from the census, was dismissed for lack of standing.10 Indeed, no 
challenge to the agency had survived and gone to trial in previ-
ous years.11 But in the summer of 1980, plaintiffs attacking cen-
5. Although the official 1970 undercount estimate was originally 5.3 million, the Bu-
reau adjusted this estimate downward on the basis of data gained in the 1980 census. 
Compare 45 Fed. Reg, 82,872, 82,880-82 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Federal Register 
Statement], with BUREAU OP THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OP COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULA-
TION REP., SERIES P-23, No. 65, DEVELOPMENTAL ESTIMATES OF THE COVERAGE oP THE 
POPULATION OF STATES IN THE 1970 CENSUS: DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS 12 (1977) [herein• 
after cited as 1977 CENSUS REPORT]. 
6. See note 102 and accompanying text infra. 
7. E.g., 1980 Decennial Census: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear 
Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Senate Hearings]; The Census Un-
dercount Problem: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Mone-
tary Affairs of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 House Hearings). 
8. 1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 349 (statement of Nathan Keyfitz). 
9. See, e.g., id. at 352-56; id. at 268-71 (remarks of Harold Goldstein). 
10. FAIR v. Klutznick, supra note 3. This Note uses the term "illegal aliens," follow-
ing the nearly universal practice of courts, commentators, and newspapers in discussing 
the census cases. The term is not intended to be pejorative; many aliens entered the 
United States illegally, but have now resided long enough to secure legal status, if they 
had the education and confidence in public authorities to obtain necessary documents. 
11. The only previously reported decision holding against the Census Bureau was 
City of Camden v. Plotkin, 466 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1978), in which plaintiffs survived a 
motion to dismiss but did not go to trial. Other earlier challenges were rejected because 
either the Bureau was found to have sufficiently reasonable administrative policies, e.g., 
Borough of Bethel Park v. Stans, 449 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1971); Confederacion de la Raza 
Unida v. Brown, 345 F. Supp. 909 (N.D. Cal. 1972); United States v. Little, 321 F. Supp. 
388 (D. Del. 1971); Prieto v. Stans, 321 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Cal. 1970); West End Neigh-
borhood Corp. v. Stans, 312 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1970); Quon v. Stans, 309 F. Supp. 
604 (N.D. Cal. 1970); City of East Chicago v. Stans, No. 70H156 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 21, 
1970), or the alleged injuries were deemed too speculative, e.g., Sharrow v. Brown, 447 
F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 968 (1972); Lampkin v. Connor, 239 F. 
Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1965), aff'd on other grounds, 360 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See gen-
erally Note, Numbers that Count: The Law and Policy of Population Statistics Used in 
Formula Grant Allocation Programs, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 229, 245 (1980) (concluding 
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sus undercounts in Detroit, and later in New York, surprised the 
agency by surviving motions to dismiss, 12 and suddenly the 
courts were flooded with challenges patterned after these two 
suits. 
A. The Detroit Case: Young v. Klutznick 
The seeds of the Detroit case were sown in November 1979, 
when a Wayne State University law professor, Robert Sedler, ar-
gued before a congressional committee that failure to adjust for 
census undercounts would abridge the Constitution.18 Sedler 
noted that the Supreme Court,s reapportionment cases clearly 
required congressional districting to be based strictly on popula-
tion. Because the constitutional function of the census was to 
produce an accurate basis for apportioning legislators/' he rea-
soned, it followed that any known inaccuracies would be consti-
tutionally impermissible. 
Sedler,s theory applied particularly well to cities like Detroit, 
where members of large minority populations have tended his-
torically to be uncounted more often than members of white 
populations.111 Because of these disproportionate undercounts, 
congressional districts with large minority populations are likely 
to contain many more people than districts with fewer minority 
residents. These imbalances thus tend to dilute the voting rights 
of the minority groups and consequently would seem to be for-
with approval, prior to the 1980 census suits, that the Bureau appeared "well insulated 
from legal attacks on its exercise of discretion in gathering and reporting data"). 
12. Young v. Klutznick, No. 80-71330 (E.D. Mich., motion to dismiss denied May 29, 
1980); Carey v. Klutznick, 508 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y.), af/'d, 637 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1980). 
13. Oversight Hearings on the 1980 Census, Part XIII: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Census and Population of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-36 (1979) (testimony of Robert A. Sedler). 
14. The Constitution as originally enacted provided: 
Representatives ... shall be apportioned among the several States ••• accord-
ing to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the 
whole Number of free Persons ••. and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths 
of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years 
after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every 
subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The fourteenth amendment repealed the initial sentence by 
providing: "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding 
Indians not taxed." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 2. 
16. For example, the Bureau has estimated that it missed 6.9% of the nation's minor-
ity populations in the 1970 census, as opposed to 1.9% of the nation's white residents. 
1977 CENSUS REPORT, supra note 5, at 97-98. 
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bidden by the Supreme Court's reapportionment decisions.16 
Hoping to use this theory to force the Census Bureau to in-
clude undercount estimates in its final 1980 figures, plaintiffs 
filed suit in Young v. Klutznick,17 alleging that failure to adjust 
would cause voting rights injuries and the city's loss of federal 
funds. Unexpectedly, they survived the Bureau's motion to dis-
miss and went on to a sweeping trial victory on their voting 
rights claim.16 Judge Horace Gilmore declared it "to be the right 
of every person within the United States of America on April 1, 
1980, to be counted in the census."19 Thus, he enjoined the 
16. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) ("the right of suffrage can be 
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as 
by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise"). 
The claim that undercounts could dilute voting rights had been made pre~•iously in 
West End Neighborhood Corp. v. Stans, 312 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1970), but was effec-
tive only in establishing that plaintiffs had alleged a sufficient injury to support standing. 
When the court turned to consideration of whether plaintiffs had made a showing of 
irreparable harm adequate to obtain relief, it inexplicably ignored the troublesome prob-
lem of voting rights injuries and denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 
Thereafter, some observers have perceived this sort of alleged injury as insignificant. See, 
e.g., Note, supra note 11, at 245 ("The weight of any given individual's vote surely will 
not be diminished by more than a trivial fraction as a result of underenumeration."). 
17. Young v. Klutznick, No. 80-71330 (E.D. Mich., motion to dismiss denied May 29, 
1980), 497 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Mich. 1980), stay granted, No. A-533 (U.S. Dec. 24, 
1980), reu'd, 652 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3404 (U.S. 
Nov. 6, 1981) (No. 81-867). 
18. The plaintiffs' loss-of-funding claim had been previously disposed of in the pre-
trial order denying the motion to dismiss. The court's analysis of this claim comprised 
one sentence in the closing discussion, and appeared to rely on the reasoning in FAIR v. 
Klutznick, supra note 3. Young v. Klutznick, No. 80-71330, slip op. at 17, (E.D. Mich. 
May 29, 1980). But see note 85 infra. 
19. 497 F. Supp. at 1319. Judge Gilmore's declaration of a "right to be counted," 
however, was unnecessary - the plaintiffs had only sought to establish their rights to be 
counted in the same proportion as other groups. Such a claim, which might be called a 
"right to be counted equally," would be cognizable as a method of ensuring that one's 
vote was accorded equal weight. See Reynolds v. Sims, 577 U;S. 533, 576 (1964)(the 
~qual protection clause guarantees the right of each voter to "have his vote weighted 
equally with those of all other citizens"). 
Indeed, it appears that there is no independent "right to be counted." See, e.g., Gaff-
ney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 746 (1973) (acknowledging that requiring apportionment 
according to parity of "census people" may be misleading, because it is the injury to 
voters that the cases are intended to address). See also Confederacion de la Raza Unida 
v. Brown, 345 F. Supp. 909, 910 (N.D. Cal. 1972)("Plaintiffs do not contend, and cor-
rectly so, that they have an absolute right to be counted"); Quon v. Stans, 309 F. Supp. 
604, 606 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Note, supra note 11, at 236 n.59, 242 (1980). 
Despite this authority, however, Judge Gilmore's declaration of a "right to be counted" 
deserves further mention. In situations other than voting rights cases, it might well be 
appropriate to recognize a "right to be counted" but not a "right to be counted equally." 
For example, children and convicted felons have no right to have their votes counted 
equally, because they cannot vote. But it may be that they could assert a right to be 
counted. Otherwise, federal funds would be allocated without reference to their needs, 
and legislators would be apportioned to districts without reference either to where they 
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Bureau from releasing its unadjusted population figures and 
lived or to whether they had special interests that needed to be represented in the 
government. 
Concerns such as these have led some to suggest something akin to a "right to be 
counted." A three-judge federal district court panel, for example, recently argued that a 
suit to exclude illegal aliens from the census probably would have been unsuccessful if 
the court had proceeded to the merits. While the court certainly understood that illegal 
aliens could not vote and therefore would have no rights "to be counted equally," none-
theless it found recognition among the drafters of both article I and the fourteenth 
amendment "that the 'non-voting classes' have a vital interest in the conduct of Govern• 
ment." "According to James Madison, the apportionment was to be 'founded on the ag-
gregate number of inhabitants' of each state .... The Framers must have been aware 
that this choice of words would include women, bound servants, convicts, [and] the in-
sane .... " FAIR v. Klutznick, supra note 3, at 576. 
Nor was it implausible, as argued in FAIR u. Klutznick, that nonvoting groups might 
have a right to be counted because of their "vital interest" in the conduct of government. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that groups with special interests may legitimately 
try to influence legislative districting to protect their interests. See United Jewish Orga-
nizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 168 (1977)(declaring it "permissible for a state, employ-
ing sound districting principles such as compactness and population equality, to attempt 
to prevent racial minorities from being repeatedly outvoted by creating districts .•• in 
which they will be in the majority.") Indeed, in one special case the Court has even 
allowed groups to complain when their interests were imperiled by redistricting. See Ma-
han v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973)(affirming the rejection of a reapportionment plan 
that, among other infirmities, "discriminated" against one subgroup, military personnel, 
by diluting the strength of their votes). 
But while the Court has allowed legislatures to consider the special interests of groups 
in devising apportionment plans, the Court has explicitly refrained from allowing groups 
to require that their interests be considered in shaping apportionment plans. Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court hes recently examined whether members of the polity can 
sue to insure that their interests lire represented, and declared unambiguously that there 
is no right to be represented. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75-80 (1980)(electo-
ral system not unconstitutional if it provides for multimember districts that dilute the 
voting power of racial minorities). The danger the Court obviously seeks to avoid is hav-
ing different groups come before the courts to argue that they are not being represented 
adequately in the political process. Those arguments would have to be given weight if 
the Court decided to view legislatures es representative bodies of special interests. But if 
that were to happen, it would surely prove impossible to sort out which groups existed as 
discrete units and deserved representation, and how individuals would be categorized 
among those groups. 
Thus, the Court has accepted a theory that depicts legislatures as simply neutral dele-
gations of the populace at large. Under this theory, citizens have no abstract rights to be 
represented, but merely rights as voters to have equal access for pressing their diverse 
interests. See, e.g., Wesberry, v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1964) ("It would defeat the 
principle solemnly embodied in the Great Compromise - equal representation in the 
House for equal numbers of people - . • . to giue some uoters a greater uoice in choos· 
ing a representatiue than others.") (emphasis added). 
The Court's resolution, however, of this fundamental issue in democratic theory may 
soon be challenged. As the FAIR u. Klutznick court appeared to recognize, the illegal 
alien influx may force the courts once again to face the distinction between a right to be 
counted and a right to be counted equally. Consider, for example, two hypothetical con• 
gressional districts in Texas, each having 500,000 inhabitants. District X has 150,000 
registered voters and 200,000 illegal aliens. District Y bas 300,000 registered voters and 
no illegal aliens. Could the registered voters of district Y claim that their votes are being 
diluted (by half) by the inclusion of illegal aliens in the census? See Ouersight Hearings 
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ordered it to adjust its final figures "at the national, state, and 
sub-state level" to include uncounted segments of black and 
Hispanic populations. The agency was directed to use methods 
that would remain in the Bureau's discretion "so long as they 
are statistically defensible. "20 
Following the trial, however, the Census Bureau protested 
that no "statistically defensible,, methods existed for adjusting 
the population totals.21 Meanwhile, the Government filed an ap-
peal with the Sixth Circuit and obtained a stay of Judge Gil-
more's injunction from Justice Stewart.22 In June 1981, months 
after the Bureau's final totals had been released for congres-
sional and state legislative reapportionment,23 the Sixth Circuit 
reversed Judge Gilmore's order with a distressingly formalistic 
ruling.24 Writing for a divided panel, Circuit Judge Merritt held 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because their alleged 
injury could not be traced to actions by the Bureau. Alterna-
tively, the court held, the challenge was not ripe for adjudication 
because the Michigan legislature had not yet used the inaccurate 
census figures for reapportionment. 
B. The New York Case: Carey v. Klutznick 
Shortly after the Detroit case survived the Bureau's motion to 
dismiss,25 a similar challenge was brought in New York against 
the Bureau, drawing on the underlying arguments advanced in 
Young but expanding their scope. In Carey v. Klutznick,26 as in 
on the 1980 Census, Part IV: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Census and Population 
of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., lat Sess. 6-20 
(1979)(statement of State Sen. H. L. Richardson, noting that because of high numbers of 
illegal aliens in some California senatorial districts, but not others, 194,213 people in 
1978 voted in one Los Angeles-area district, while only 73,998 voted in an adjoining 
district). 
20. 497 F. Supp; at 1338-39. 
21. Report of the United States Bureau of the Census in Response to the Judgment 
of the Court Entered September 30, 1980, at 3-4, filed October 27, 1980, and Second 
Report of the United States Bureau of the Census in Reponse to the Judgment of the 
Court Entered September 30, 1980, at 3-4, filed November 13, 1980, Young v. Klutznick, 
497 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Mich. 1980). 
22. Klutznick v. Young, No. A-533 (U.S., stay granted Dec. 24, 1980). 
23. The deadlines for reporting the Census results were Jan. 1, 1981, for national 
results, and April 1, 1981, for results on approximately 39,000 sub-state areas. 13 U.S.C. 
§§ 141 (b), (c) (1976). 
24. Young v. Klutznick, 652 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1981); see notes 49-58 and accompany-
ing text infra. 
25. The Michigan court denied the Bureau's motion to dismiss on May 29, 1980. On 
August 8, 1980, the New York suit was filed. 
26. 508 F. Supp. 404, and 508 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 637 F.2d 834 (2d 
160 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 15:1 
Young, the plaintiffs claimed that federal funds would be lost 
and congressional districting unconstitutionally imbalanced be-
cause of disproportionate undercounts. In addition, however, the 
Carey plaintiffs argued that so many poor people, blacks, His-
panics, and aliens would be uncounted that the state would lose 
at least one representative in Congress and one vote in the Elec-
toral College. This considerably broadened the constitutional 
base for the Carey challenge by suggesting further violations of 
articles !27 and II, 28 in addition to the article I theory developed 
in Young. 
Because the Carey challenge required a demonstration that 
the undercount was sufficiently large to cost the state a repre-
sentative, plaintiffs sought through discovery to obtain certain 
census records that Bureau officials acknowledged were "basic" 
for identifying census errors.29 Despite a trial court order,30 the 
Bureau insisted that the information sought was confidential 
under the Census Act and therefore privileged.31 After threaten-
Cir. 1980); 508 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y.), stay granted, 449 U.S. 1068 (1980), reu'd and 
remanded, 653 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3352 (U.S. 
Oct. 20, 1981) (No. 81-752). 
27. The Supreme Court ruled in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964), that "as 
nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much 
as another's." This ruling was grounded in article I of the Constitution, which provides 
that "Representatives . • . shall be apportioned among the several States . • . according 
to their respective Numbers •... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cL 3. 
Article I clearly requires that apportionment among states be based on actual popula-
tion, as the New York plaintiff's argued in their suit. The Detroit claim, that voting 
strength within states cannot be diluted either, is consistent with Wesberry, see notes 
71-77 and accompanying text infra, but not so obviously derived from article I. See Wes-
berzy v. Sanders, 376 U.S. at 20 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
28. Article II of the Constitution provides that "Each state shall appoint ... a Num-
ber of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the 
State may be entitled in the Congress •.•• " U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, cl. 2. If New York 
is in fact "entitled" to an additional representative, the operation of the Electoral Col-
lege using unadjusted figures is arguably unconstitutional. 
29. In Carey, plaintiff's sought address registers and vacant housing lists to determine 
whether the Bureau had correctly included all people in given areas. The significance of 
this discovezy request was underscored when the associate director of the Census Bureau 
"testified that the address register 'is the basic document controlling' the entire census 
process." Brief of Amici Curiae, The State of New York, The City of New York, Gover-
nor Hugh L. Carey, Mayor Edward I. Koch, et al. at 12, Baldridge [sic] v. Shapiro, cert. 
granted, 101 S. Ct. 2015 (1981); McNichols v. Baldridge [sic], cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 
3079 (1981)(cases consolidated by the Court for purposes of oral argument, August 28, 
1981) [hereinafter cited as Amici Brief]. 
30. For a histozy of the Census Bureau's refusal to tum over the information covered 
by discovezy order, see id. at 4-5. See also Carey v. Klutznick, 508 F. Supp at 432. 
31. The statute provides: 
Neither the Secretazy, nor any other officer or employee of the Department of 
Commerce or bureau or agency thereof, may, except as provided in section 8 of 
this title -
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ing to invoke contempt sanctions, federal District Judge Henry 
Werker finally entered an order precluding the Bureau from 
making any arguments at trial that the plaintiffs would have 
been able to challenge had they received the withheld 
documents. 
Meanwhile, the Government once more had moved to dismiss 
the suit, as it had in Young, and again the trial court had denied 
the motion.82 This time, however, the Government took a direct 
appeal of the denial to the Second Circuit. In early December 
1980, the Second Circuit unanimously upheld the trial court's 
findings of standing and justiciability.88 A week later, District 
Judge Werker ruled for the plaintiffs at trial and enjoined the 
nationwide release of census figures until the Bureau had ad-
justed the population totals for New York City and New York 
State.84 
The Government succeeded again in obtaining a Supreme 
Court stay of the trial court injunction. 85 At the same time, the 
Bureau appealed once more to the Second Circuit. Six months 
later, a new panel of Second Circuit judges reversed and re-
manded for a new trial, 88 while suggesting that the judiciary 
should not be entertaining such cases at all. 87 In a perplexing 
(1) use the information furnished under the provisions of this title for any 
purpose other than the statistical purposes for which it is supplied; or 
(2) make any publication whereby the data furnished by any particular estab-
lishment or individual under this title can be identified; or 
(3) permit anyone other than the sworn officers and employees of the Depart-
ment or bureau or agency thereof to examine the individual reports. 
No department, bureau, agency, officer, or employee of the Government, except 
the Secretary in carrying out the purposes of this title, shall require, for any 
reason, copies of census reports which have been retained by any such establish-
ment or individual. Copies of census reports which have been so retained shall 
be immune from legal process, and shall not, without the consent of the individ-
ual or establishment concerned, be admitted as evidence, or used for any pur-
pose in any action, suit, or other judicial or administrative proceeding. 
13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1976). The Bureau argued that the statute extends confidentiality to 
"all information or data provided to the Census Bureau under the Act." Carey v. Klutz. 
nick, 653 F.2d 732, 740 (2d Cir. 1981) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
32. Carey v. Klutznick, 508 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
33. 637 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1980). 
34. 508 F. Supp. at 433. 
35. Klutznick v. Carey, 449 U.S. 1068 (stay granted 1980). 
36. Carey v. Klutznick, 653 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1981). 
37. The earlier Second Circuit panel had clearly taken the position that the judiciary 
should not be passive in this setting, as the later panel acknowledged. Id. at 737. None-
theless, the later panel accompanied that acknowledgment with a citation, id., to a report 
by a New York bar association committee, see note 4 supra, that had recommended 
judicial restraint. The unmistakable implication is that the later panel was simply re-
versing the earlier court's judgment. 
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opinion,88 Circuit Judge Van Graafeiland ruled that the trial 
court should have included, as indispensable parties, other states 
who might be affected if New York were awarded another con-
gressional representative. No other state had ever asked to inter-
vene in the suit, however, nor was it clear what role such states 
might play upon retrial of the case. 89 As an alternative ground 
for its decision, the appellate panel held that Judge Werker's 
contempt sanction had been too broad, and that some of the 
documents he had ordered released were in fact privileged under 
the Census Act."0 
38. The court proposed four alternatives to the lower court's handling of the case, 
including (1) giving notice of the suit to other states, with any state "which felt that its 
interests were imperiled" being granted permission to intervene, (2) seeking multidistrict 
or coordinated proceedings, (3) staying the effect of its own decision pending review, and 
(4) substituting Bureau and congressional review for that of the court. 653 F.2d at 737-
38. 
These alternatives are puzzling for several reasons. First, Congress and the Bureau 
both had been aware of the undercount problem for years, but neither had acted directly 
to protect the plaintiffs' rights - and there was no reason to think either would. Second, 
all states surely had gained notice of the suit through the national news, but no state had 
sought to intervene. Third, the plaintiffs had sought to prove - and, according to the 
district court, had succeeded in proving - that the national undercount was dispropor-
tionately worse in New York. While that does not completely undercut the desirability of 
·multidistrict litigation, as a practical matter the proceedings in Maryland to date, see 
note 40 infra, have not home fruit, and should not be relied upon to redress legitimate 
grievances. Finally, the stay suggested by the Second Circuit had in fact been granted. 
39. Moreover, "[t]he district court order provided that any appropriate relief should 
be formulated by the Census Bureau in a manner that safeguards the absent interested 
parties." 653 F.2d at 746 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
40. The court's holding on the question of compelled disclosure focused on an issue 
already before the Supreme Court through two additional cases in which the Bureau, 
maintaining its broad resistance to the census challenges, had rebuffed challengers seek-
ing census records for their undercount suits. In Baldrige v. Shapiro, both the New 
Jersey federal district court and the Third Circuit had rejected the Bureau's argument 
that address lists used in delivering census forms were exempt under the Freedom of 
Information Act ("FOIA"). Shapiro v. Klutznick, No. 80-2638 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 1980), 
aff'd mem., 636 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir.), stay granted, 101 S. Ct. 779 (1980), cert. granted sub 
nom. Baldridge [sic] v. Shapiro, 101 S. Ct. 2015 (1981). In McNichols v. Baldrige, plain-
tiffs were thwarted in their efforts to obtain vacant housing lists from the Census Bureau 
through discovery. McNichols v. Klutznick, No. 80-C-1151 (D. Colo. Sept. 17, 1980), 
rev'd, 644 F.2d 844 (10th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. McNichols v. Baldridge [sic], 101 
S. Ct. 3079 (1981). The Tenth Circuit accepted the Bureau's argument that the Census 
Act made such information confidential and immune from discovery. 644 F.2d 844 (10th 
Cir. 1981). Writing for unanimous court, Circuit Judge McKay interpreted both the his-
tory of the Census Act and the broad language of its confidentiality provisions as indicat-
ing clear congressional intent to make census information immune from discovery. "The 
government has promised its citizens that census information will be kept confidential," 
Judge McKay declared. "In these times when confidence in the government's resolve to 
keep its promises to its citizens is not notorious, we should not readily find excuses to 
abandon or prohibit the enforcement of those promises." 
The Shapiro and McNichols cases represented the fourth and fifth census-related 
suits to reach the Supreme Court, when added to the Detroit and New York cases and 
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Thus, by the fall of 1981, the census challenges had been com-
pletely ineffective in preventing the use of unadjusted census 
totals for reapportionment or government funding. Ironically, no 
court had ruled against the underlying constitutional theories of 
the census challenges. But in every case, nonetheless, the Bureau 
or the courts had produced a procedural or statutory bar to full 
relief. 
II. THE LEGAL ISSUES RAISED IN THE CENSUS CHALLENGES 
Aside from resisting discovery of census information, the Bu-
reau countered the 1980 undercount suits by arguing that the 
suits were neither justiciable nor meritorious. The claims of non-
justiciability were phrased somewhat differently from case to 
case, but in general the Bureau argued that (1) the plaintiffs 
lacked standing, (2) the challenges were not ripe for adjudica-
tion, and (3) the Bureau's actions were either entirely immune 
from judicial review, or subject to review only where arbitrary, 
capricious, or contrary to law. Next, in arguing against the mer-
its of the suits, the Bureau directly contested the claims that the 
Constitution required an accurate census for either congressional 
or state legislative redistricting. Moreover, the Bureau denied 
that it was obligated to produce an accurate census for govern-
ment funding purposes. When all of these objections are ex-
amined closely, their weaknesses make it strikingly clear that 
the Bureau's successes must have been produced by more than 
their arguments alone. 
A. Justiciability of the Census Challenges 
1. Standing- The Bureau's argument that the census chal-
the early case that had sought exclusion of illegal aliens from the census. In addition, 
literally dozens of other suits had swamped the federal courts in the wake of the initial 
Detroit rulings. See Carey v. Klutznick, 653 F.2d at 735 n.10. An undercount suit had 
been brought in Philadelphia, for example, and had survived a motion to dismiss by the 
Bureau which was virtually identical to the unsuccessful motions in Young and Carey, 
City of Philadelphia v. Klutznick, 503 F. Supp. 663 {E.D. Pa. 1980), appeal argued, No. 
80-2785 {3d Cir. April 24, 1981), despite the trial court's emphatically negative first im-
pression expressed while denying a motion for a preliminary injunction. City of Philadel-
phia v. Klutznick, 503 F. Supp. 659, 661 {E.D. Pa. 1980). The Philadelphia suit was 
derailed, however, when the Bureau moved to have it and eight other undercount suits 
consolidated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, which transfened the 
cases to Maryland where they promptly became stalled in discovery. In re 1980 Decen-
nial Census Adjustment Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 648 {J.P.M.D.L. 1981). 
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lengers lacked standing drew upon the Supreme Court's two 
principal requirements for recognizing standing: that a possibil-
ity exist of "a 'distinct and palpable injur[y],' to the plaintiffs," 
and that there be "a 'fairly traceable' causal connection between 
the claimed injury and the challenged conduct."41 The Bureau 
argued first that both the vote dilution and funding loss claims 
were too speculative to meet the "distinct and palpable" stan-
dard. Second, the Bureau contended that no "fairly traceable" 
connection could be drawn between the agency's actions in com-
piling the census, and any injuries that might arise when legisla-
tures misallocated funds or misapportioned representatives. 
In regard to the first standing requirement, the census chal-
lengers had little difficulty showing a "distinct and palpable in-
jury." Though the effects of undercounts on government funding 
may be unclear,42 there is little doubt that voting strength can 
be diluted substantially by disproportionate undercounts. In the 
Young litigation, for example, it was predicted that in the 1980 
census the Bureau was again likely to miss a significantly higher 
percentage of blacks than whites. Clearly this would be more 
harmful to Detroit, a city estimated to be sixty-percent black, 
41. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72, 74 
(1978) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)); Arlington Heights v. Metro• 
politan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977); Simon v. Eastern Ky. 
Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976). These two requirements fulfill the 
condition that "the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in 
fact, economic or otherwise." Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). In addition, for there to be standing to challenge admin-
istrative action under § 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976), 
it is necessary that "the interest sought to be protected is arguably within the zone of 
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion." 397 U.S. at 153. The Bureau generally did not challenge whether the voting rights 
or rights-to-government-funding claims satisfied this condition. 
42. Federal funds are distributed in a variety of ways, including by population, by 
per capita income, by school-age population, and by number of unemployed. The Census 
Bureau analyze9, the effects of undercount adjustments on funding in 1977 and con-
cluded: "Correction of the population figures by the coverage estimates developed in this 
study makes little difference in the funds allocated to most states, but for some states 
the change in funds would be·substantial." 1977 CENSUS REPORT, supra note 5, at 106. 
Interestingly, the Bureau added that there likely would be as many states - if not 
more - that lost funds as gained them through the corrections. Id. In fact, the Bureau's 
study ironically suggests that both Michigan and New York, as well as other Northeast-
ern states, would lose money if undercount adjustments were made. Id. at 111-12. But 
see note 87 infra. For example, some federal programs distribute funds on the basis of 
recent loss of population, so that one researcher has argued that undercount adjustments 
actually could decrease funding for a city like Trenton, N.J. See Blum, Census and Sen-
sibilities, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 14, 1981, at 15. See also Cities Reportedly Overstate Ef-
fect of '80 Census on Aid, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 1; notes 85-88 and accom-
panying text infra. 
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than other 'areas of Michigan.43 Similarly, in the Carey litigation 
trial evidence established that the Bureau's mismanagement of 
the census process in New York had possibly cost the state a 
congressional representative. That result too would clearly con-
stitute a cognizable injury to voting rights - even if New York 
were the only state suffering such injury. 
The second standing requirement, that a "fairly traceable" 
causal connection exist between the plaintiffs' injuries and the 
Bureau's actions, proved to be the more difficult hurdle for the 
1980 challengers. This requirement serves two broad functions: 
it allows courts to dismiss claims against parties who should not 
be held responsible for the plaintiff's injuries, and it ensures 
"that the exercise of the Court's remedial powers would redress 
the claimed injuries."44 Unfortunately, the Bureau focused its 
43. Brief for Appellee, Young v. Klutznick, 652 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1981). 
44. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 
(1978). The requirement applies to three separate situations where courts may decline to 
recognize standing. The first is when the complained-of conduct simply cannot be said to 
have produced the alleged injury. See, e.g., Winpisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 133 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980) (use of federal funds by campaign committee of incumbent President not re-
sponsible for rival candidate's failure to gain support). The second is when the courts 
could consider one party responsible for the indirect effects of its actions, but that is not 
considered fair. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (plaintiffs denied standing 
because their inability to secure inexpensive housing was due far more to the economics 
of the housing market than to the town's zoning practices). 
The third and final situation in which courts may deny standing is when courts recog-
nize that even if one party "caused" the complained-of injury, ordering a change in the 
conduct may not succeed in preventing the injury. See, e.g., Greater Tampa Chamber of 
Commerce v. Goldschmidt, 627 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (even if air-travel agreement 
implemented by Secretary of State was invalid because it required Senate ratification, no 
showing that court invalidation would enable plaintiffs to obtain more amenable terms 
than those of the current agreement). 
Determining whether a case falls within one of the first two situations is often notori-
ously difficult, see note 46 infra, for it will often be an inscrutable question whether a 
particular act may be said even indirectly to have "caused" injury. The third situation 
presents a wholly different issue, because even if the court orders the challenged conduct 
changed, the injury will not necessarily be relieved. To avoid these situations, courts can 
turn to the Supreme Court's requirement that there be a "substantial likelihood" that 
the relief requested will redress the injury claimed, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. at 74, although cases rejecting standing on this basis 
are surprisingly uncommon. 
While no Supreme Court case has yet rejected standing because the requested relief 
will be pointless, several lower court cases have denied standing on this basis. See, e.g., 
Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce v. Goldschmidt, 627 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 
NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Harris, 607 F.2d 514 (1st Cir. 1979); City of Hartford v. 
Towns of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane). Other courts faced with 
such standing issues should follow the lead of these cases and simply acknowledge that 
they lack the power to bring about relief, rather than engaging in Herculean efforts to 
rationalize, using article III, their refusal to hear the merits. "As with many other areas 
of justiciability concern, in short, it would be better to forgo resort to article ill and 
supposed limits on judicial power in favor of direct attention to the substantive and 
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defense on the first function, arguing that it should not be held 
responsible for "causing" the alleged funding and vote-dilution 
injuries. Instead, at least by early spring 1981, the Bureau 
should have argued that no "substantial likelihood" remained 
that the relief requested would redress the injury claimed;H 
The Bureau's argument that it did not "cause" the alleged in-
juries was intrinsically flawed, for such a defense depends en-
tirely on how "cause" is defined.48 Defining "cause" sometimes 
will be uncontroversial, because the connection between the acts 
and the injuries is fairly direct (or alternatively, entirely non-
existent). For example, if the Bureau fails to count 750,000 to 
900,000 people in New York State, it is beyond question that the 
agency will directly "cause" the state to lose a representative in 
Congress.47 
But on other occasions, a legal finding of causation is not so 
straightforward, requiring a court to wrestle with how far it will 
go in tying together actions and injuries. For example, in Young 
the plaintiffs argued that it was the census undercounts that 
would "cause" Detroit residents to lose voting strength, even 
though the Michigan legislature ultimately was responsible for 
deciding what population data to use in apportionment. Simi-
larly, plaintiffs in both Young and Carey argued that the Bureau 
would "cause" the loss of government funds, although Congress 
has ultimate responsibility for allocating federal monies. In ei-
ther case, the real decision the courts had to make was whether 
remedial problems raised by the particular case." 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CoOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 112 (Cum. Supp. 1980); see note 45 infra. 
45. The Sixth Circuit, however, explicitly rejected this basis for its decision. 652 F.2d 
at 625 n.8. But while the Sixth Circuit's basis for denying standing was extremely ques-
tionable, see note 54 infra, direct attention to the remedial problems could have led to a 
more defensible decision not to award relief, on grounds of impracticality. See pts. m B, 
ill C infra. 
46. See generally J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 139-44 (1978) (arguing that use of con-
cepts such as foreseeability in standing discussions are conclusory in that they are "gov-
erned by the determinants of the decision to hold the defendant responsible"; moreover, 
"any attempts to distinguish between causal chains as such ••. may be expected to fail, 
for the ways in which outcomes are brought about in the human world are still mysteri-
ous"). For criticism of the causation doctrines adopted by the Young court, see note 54 
infra. 
47. The Bureau originally argued that New York could not establish any injury be-
cause plaintiff's historically have been unable to prove that the complex formula used for 
apportioning representatives among states was functioning improperly. See FAffi v. 
Klutznick, supra note 3; Sharrow v. Brown, 447 F.2d 94 (2d Cif. 1971), cert. denied, 405 
U.S. 968 (1972); Lampkin v. Connor, 239 F. Supp. 757 (D.D.C. 1965), aff'd on other 
grounds, 360 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1966). For a thorough explanation of the formula, see 
Sch.meckebier, The Method of Equal Proportions, 17 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 302 (1952). 
In fact, however, the challengers in Carey appear to have established that enough people 
were missed to make the loss of a representative quite possible. 
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they would choose to connect up the Bureau's actions and the 
plaintiffs' injuries. 48 
In their rulings, therefore, the courts could not contend plau-
sibly that the Bureau's actions were unconnected with the plain• 
tiffs' injuries, because Congress and virtually all states indeed do 
use census figures for apportionment and fund allocation. In-
stead, the courts could decide only that the Bureau's role was 
too indirect - as the Sixth Circuit ultimately held.49 But as dis-
senting Sixth Circuit Judge Keith argued, such a view of causa-
tion was disingenuous, given the realities of the apportionment 
process, as well as excessively restrictive in view of traditional 
legal doctrines. 150 
48. The courts should have been particularly receptive to the census challenges, not 
just because of the realities of apportionment itself, see notes 52-53 and accompanying 
text infra, or the general state of legal doctrine concerning causation, see note 54 infra, 
but also for three reasons rooted in the defendant's posture as a public agency and the 
particular subject matter of the suits. 
First, because the defendant was a government agency, the remedies sought were dif-
ferent from those generally at issue in private litigation. Holding a defendant liable or 
blameworthy in private litigation means that the defendant will be required to give up 
assets or position. By contrast, in the census cases the plaintiffs sought only to prevent 
future errors in funding and apportionment, not to prejudice the defendant's interests or 
to "restructure the past." J. VINING, supra note 46, at 142. Thus, the courts had less 
reason to be concerned about being unfair in granting the requested relief. 
Second, because the census challenges relied on allegations that relatively clear consti-
tutional doctrines were being violated, they resembled many suits against public agencies 
that involve challenges framed around independent texts such as statutes or the Consti-
tution. These independent texts represent pronouncements about wrongdoing developed 
by legislatures or the people as a whole, and not just the judiciary. Because the courts 
thus have independent support for their determinations,· in cases like the census chal-
lenges the courts need not be as wary of manipulating the entire fault-finding process as 
they might be in common law tort cases, for example. Consequently, the courts can be 
less reticent in finding a defendant to be an "indirect cause" than they might be where 
they are ruling not only on whether a link existed to the wrong, but also whether a 
"wrong" even occurred in the first place. Id. at 142. 
Finally, because the census cases involved efforts to protect uncontested constitutional 
values, the courts should have been especially willing to adjudicate the merits of the 
cases. Professor Fiss has suggested this argument in his analogous discussion of the judi-
ciary's role in overseeing governmental bureaucracies. There he criticizes restrictive judi-
cial policies like the adoption of the "tailoring principle - the insistence that the rem-
edy must fit the violation." That principle, Fiss contends, suggests "that the relationship 
between remedy and violation is deductive or formal," which "gives us an improverished 
notion of remedy." Instead, he argues, courts dealing with governmental agencies should 
assume as their responsibility "not to eliminate a 'violation' in the sense implied by the 
tailoring principle, but rather to remove the threat posed by the organization to the con-
stitutional values." Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term -Foreword: The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1, 46-48 (1979). 
49. Specifically, the court declined to hold the Bureau responsible because "[a]n in-
dependent third party, the Michigan legislature, would play a necessary role in deter-
mining the effects of the census upon plaintiffs." Young v. Klutznick, 652 F.2d 617, 624 
(6th Cir. 1981). -
50. 652 F.2d at 627, 629 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith came to the Young cha!-
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First, the Sixth Circuit was disingenuous when it dismissed 
the contention that the Bureau had "caused" a dilution of vot-
ing strength. The court concluded that "having found no legal 
compulsion that the state act in a certain way, we may not pre-
dict what decisions the state legislature will, in fact, make."111 
Yet not only do nearly all states use census data for legislative 
and congressional apportionment,112 but a number of them - in-
cluding Michigan - are required to do so by their state consti-
tutions.113 Even more important, assuming that any states would 
have the resources to set up their own census op'erations, it 
seems extremely unlikely that many would want to adopt figures 
other than those released by the Bureau. Disputes about which 
numbers to use would only become another area for controversy 
in the ferocious battles that already accompany reappor-
tionment. 
Second, as Judge Keith contended at length, the Sixth Cir-
cuit's restrictive view of standing was not compelled by recent 
Supreme Court decisions. In fact, the court's analysis contrasted 
sharply with theories of causation generally applied in such legal 
contexts as torts, for example.15' 
lenge well aware of the realities of the Michigan legislature's reapportionment proce-
dures. In 1972, following the nation's last census, then-District Judge Keith was forced to 
choose a congressional districting plan for the state, after the Michigan legislature 
proved unable - despite court prodding and time extensions - to agree on its own 
arrangement. Dunnell v. Austin, 344 F. Supp. 210 {E.D. Mich. 1972). 
51. 652 F.2d at 625. 
52. The district court in Young declared that "(a]ll of the 50 states are required to 
use census data for the purpose of congressional districting," 497 F. Supp. at 1325. While 
this statement is not accurate, see note 70 infra, nonetheless, most states do use census 
data for congressional and legislative districting, and generally there is a legal presump-
tion in favor of the authority of census figures - at least for reapportioning congres-
sional districts. 
53. Both Michigan and New York have constitutional provisions requiring that fed-
eral census data be used for state legislative apportionment. MlcH. CONST. art. 4, §§ 2, 3; 
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4. 
54. 652 F.2d at 629-33 (Keith, J., dissenting). The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the 
Michigan legislature was an "intervening actor," so that the Bureau was not an appropri-
ate defendant. Id. at 625. The majority relied on Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 
Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), in which the Supreme Court had said that "the 'case or 
controversy' limitation of art. III still requires that a federal court act only to redress 
injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury 
that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court." Id. at 
41-42. 
The Sixth Circuit's approach had earlier been adopted in Borough of Bethel Park v. 
Stans, 449 F.2d 575, 582 n.4 (3d Cir. 1971), and FAIR v. Klutznick, supra note 3, at 570 
n.11. See also Note, Democracy and Distrust: Constitutional Issues of the Federal Cen-
sus, 94 HARV. L. REv. 841, 859 (1981). 
But Simon is distinguishable from Young, as Judge Keith pointed out. 652 F.2d at 633 
(Keith, J., dissenting). See also City of Philadelphia v. Klutznick, 503 F. Supp. 663, 671 
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2. Ripeness- Three trial courts and the Second Circuit55 re-
jected the Bureau's argument that the undercount cases were 
not ripe for adjudication in 1980, but in Young v. Klutznick the 
Sixth Circuit found ripeness to be an alternative ground for dis-
missing the Detroit suit. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that "the 
Michigan state legislature has not yet expressed its reaction to 
the census enumeration," and that "heightened public sensitiv-
ity to the problems of census undercounts makes past reliance 
on census figures an uncertain predictor of future legislative 
action. "118 
The Sixth Circuit's argument hardly seems plausible; as dis-
cussed above, there is every reason to expect that Michigan will 
use unadjusted census data for apportionment. 57 Every state in 
the nation now uses census figures for congressional apportion-
ment, and no evidence in Young suggested that the Michigan 
legislature has either the interest or the resources to develop al-
ternative · population figures. Therefore, rather than rely on a 
ripeness argument that was demonstrably unrealistic, the Sixth 
Circuit should have recognized the obvious inapplicability of the 
(E.D. Pa. 1980). In Simon, the Supreme Court denied standing to plaintiffs who argued 
that reductions in free hospital services to poor people had been caused by an Internal 
Revenue Service decision to loosen its interpretation of a statutoey provision about tax-
e:r.empt status. The Court said that it was "purely speculative whether the denials of 
service specified in the complaint fairly can be traced to petitioners' 'encouragement' or 
instead result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to the tax implica-
tions." 426 U.S. at 43. In Young, on the other hand, the Bureau's role in producing the 
challengers' injury was far more than "purely speculative." Rather, it was clear that the 
plaintiffs' alleged injury could not occur "but for" the causal effect of the Bureau's un-
dercounting. See Carey v. Klutznick, 637 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir. 1980), afl'g 508 F. Supp. 
404 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); City of Philadelphia v. Klutznick, 503 F. Supp. 663, 671 (E.D. Pa. 
1980); City of Camden v. Plotkin, 466 F. Supp. 44, 47-51 (D.N.J. 1978). See also Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (applying an 
exceedingly relaxed causation standard: plaintiffs had standing because if they were suc-
cessful in challenging the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act, which allows nu-
clear power plants to limit their liability, a disputed plant might not be built and the 
plaintiffs' injuries might not occur); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-05 (1975) ("The 
fact that the harm to petitioners may have resulted indirectly does not in itself preclude 
standing."); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973) (standing is not to be 
denied simply because there may be an "attenuated line of causation to the eventual 
injury"). 
Finally, see L. TRIBE, AMER1cAN CoNSTITUTIONAI. LAW 93 (1978) ("The causation re-
quirement is thus highly manipulable [and] poses a serious risk that, in the guise of 
causality analysis, federal courts will engage in an unprincipled effort to screen from 
their dockets claims which they substantively disfavor."). 
55. Carey v: Klutznick, 637 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1980), af/'g 508 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980); City of Philadelphia v. Klutznick, 503 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Young v. 
Klutznick, No. 80-71330 (E.D. Mich., motion to dismiss denied May 29, 1980). 
56. 652 F.2d at 626. 
57. See notes 52-53 and ~ccompanying text supra. 
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two concerns that underlie the Supreme Court's ripeness doc-
trine. The Bureau's public declaration that it would not adjust 
for undercounts meant that the courts could not have been "en-
tangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administra-
tive policies" by entertaining the census challenges. Moreover, 
with the census already compiled and released in ostensil;>ly final 
form, there was no need "to protect the agency from judicial in-
terference until an administrative decision ha[d] been formal-
ized and its effects felt in a concrete way."158 Indeed, the timing 
of the census challenges seems to have been particularly appro-
priate. Given the levels of judicial review encountered by the 
challenges, and given the time lags that were anticipated for de-
veloping adequate relief, the Sixth Circuit's rationale is espe-
cially unconvincing. 
3. Reviewability of agency . actions- The final major jus-
ticiability argument advanced by the Bureau was that its man-
agement of the 1980 census was immune from judicial review, or 
at most subject to reversal only if the agency had acted in a way 
that was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law. The 
courts rejected the former claim of absolute immunity out-of-
hand, with the district court in Carey, for example, noting that 
without convincing evidence of congressional intent it would not 
infer restrictions on judicial review of agency actions. 159 
A more troublesome issue arose with the Bureau's latter claim 
that judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act 
("APA") permitted reversal only where the agency's actions had 
been arbitrary or contrary to law.60 This standard had not pre-
vented the trial court in Young from concluding that the Bu-
reau's decision not to. adjust for undercounts violated the Con-
stitution and was therefore contrary to law.61 Nor had the 
standard prevented the trial court in Carey from finding the Bu-
reau's management of the New York census process to be suf-
ficiently flawed that adjustments in the count were required. 82 
58. The cited concerns are drawn from the Supreme Court's classic discussion of the 
ripeness doctrine in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967). See 
also Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974) ("One does not 
have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. H the 
injury is certainly impending that is enough.") (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 
262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923)). 
59. 508 F. Supp. at 413. 
60. Section 706 provides that a reviewing court may "hold unlawful and set aside . • • 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be - (A) arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 
(1976). 
61. 497 F. Supp, at 1335-36. 
62. 508 F. Supp. at 429-31. The census is conducted in essentially two stages. First, 
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But a problem did develop when the Bureau sought to insulate 
its determination - arguably well within its field of expertise 
and beyond the competence of the courts - that "statistically 
defensible" adjustments were "infeasible." 
Though deference to the determinations of expert agencies 
often is necessary,63 to have deferred automatically to the Bu-
reau on whether relief was "infeasible" obviously would have 
stalemated the census challenges. Ultimately, both the Young 
the Bureau mails out questionnaires that must be completed and returned. Second, 
workers disperse throughout communities to clarify or obtain information where forms 
were filled out improperly or never returned. Errors that could produce an undercount 
may arise at both stages. 
Problems in the first stage limited the successfulness of the mail-out, mail-back tech-
nique in New York, and drew heayY criticism from the Carey court. These included: (1) 
failure to distribute forms in languages other than English (though there are twenty lan-
guages spoken by 10;000 or more people in New York City, 1979 House Hearings, supra 
note 7, at 11); (2) inadequate advertising to minority audiences; (3) use of commercial 
mailing lists that included only fragmentary coverage of low-income areas; and (4) poor 
mail delivery. As a result of these factors, while the "overall mail return rate for New 
York City was 72 percent[, i]n parts of the city the return rate was considerably lower, 
decreasing to only 48 percent in Bedford-Stuyvesant." 508 F. Supp. at 425. Moreover, 
most of these factors had been anticipated well before the census, to little avail. See 1979 
Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 211-12; 1979 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 4. 
Another set of factors acted to produce an undercount at the second stage of con-
ducting the census, when census workers actually went out to gather information. These 
factors included administrative policies such as paying workers on a piece-rate system, 
instead of an hourly wage, a practice found directly responsible for "the high turnover 
rate among enumerators as well as ..• [the] falsification of questionnaires," 508 F. 
Supp. at 431, that occurred when workers would invent answers for assigned census 
forms rather than verify information directly in distant or unsafe· neighborhoods. 
Finally, aside from these administrative factors, both the Young and Carey trial courts 
· noted a number of characteristics that made counting black and Hispanic areas more 
difficult. These factors 4tcluded "greater antagonism or resistance to the government," 
increased numbers of people who are harder to locate and count, and "lower income 
leading to . . . lawful or unlawful conversion of. housing units to accommodate increased 
numbers of people." Young v. Klutznick, 497 F. Supp. at 1327-28. See also the colloquy 
between Senator John Glenn of Ohio and Mayor Marion Barry, Jr., of Washington, D.C.: 
SENATOR GLENN: The people in the minority areas are the ones that are 
most affected by the revenue funds that come out of this thing. It has to be 
important to impress on them that every single person get counted. If they 
don't, they are hurting themselves .... 
MAYOR BARRY: Mr. Chairman, I don't know how we can do it ... most of 
the people who are uncounted are also the ones you mentioned need the help the 
most. Their philosophy or feeling is one of survival on a day-to-day basis. They 
don't worry about what comes through the mail or filling out forms and under-
standing it. They just throw it in the trash can or use it for paper to start a fire 
1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 224-25. 
63. See Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U.S. 
281, 283-84 (1974); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971)("Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate 
standard or review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency."). 
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and Carey trial courts chose to override the Bureau's judgment, 
and each court ordered the agency to develop adjustment reme-
dies despite the Bureau's reservations. This approach seems rea-
sonable, especially because the agency had reached its determi-
nation only after it was enmeshed in litigation, when its motives 
may well have been mixed.64 Nonetheless, the orders to develop 
adjustments failed to solve the ultimate problem: what to do if 
the Bureau's judgment of infeasibility had been sound. 65 
B. The Merits of the Challengers' Arguments 
1. Dilution of voting rights- Although in reality the un-
dercount suits were · brought largely to safeguard government 
funding, in the courtrooms the plaintiffs focused principally on · 
the weakening of voting rights caused by undercounts. This was 
the argument that distinguished the 1980 challenges from previ-
64. The argument had been raised previously in City of Newark v. Blumenthal, 457 
F. Supp. 30, 34 (D.D.C. 1978), that defensible undercount adjustments were not feasible. 
See Note, supra note 11, at 251-52 nn.182-84. But the point was not argued seriously in 
the initial 1980 challenges. In fact, throughout the undercount challenges, the Bureau's 
policymakers - who were admittedly under intense political pressures - acted in a way 
that regrettably invites skepticism about their motives in finding adjustments to be sta-
tistically infeasible. The background for the agency's conclusion is worth recalling. 
Well before the actual census, the Bureau had been aware of the likelihood of chal-
lenges to census undercounts, given Congress' 1972 decision to distribute revenue-shar-
ing funds according to population. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 16 (state-
ment of Census Bureau Acting Dir. Robert L. Hagan); id. at 18 (remarks of Census 
Bureau Assoc. Dir. Daniel B. Levine). Nonetheless, despite widespread recommendations 
from expert observers, see note 9 supra, the Bureau tentatively decided not to adjust its 
figures. At least two reasons have been cited for this decision. First, the Bureau was 
concerned about losing its credibility as an apolitical agency if it adjusted figures. See 
1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 365-67 (statement of Bryant Robey). Second, the 
Bureau wanted to ensure that people would take seriously their responsibility of re-
sponding to the census. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 26 (remarks of Cen-
sus Bureau Assoc. Dir. Daniel B. Levine). 
Having adopted this policy, the Bureau met the first of the 1980 undercount chal-
lenges with a demonstrably implausible argument that the Constitution forbade adjust-
ments. See notes 89-90 and accompanying text infra. Once the agency began losing in 
the courts, it adopted a defiant posture toward releasing court-ordered discovery evi-
dence. See note 40 supra. See also Census Director Defends Refusal to Release Data, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1980, at 27, col. 6. Additionally, the agency generally showed poor 
faith in performing and reporting on mandated remedial studies that undercut its posi-
tion. See, e.g., Letter from Carey attorney Robert S. Rifkind to District Judge Werker 
(Jan. 27, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). As a final step, before adopting 
the position that "statistically defensible" adjustments were infeasible, the Bureau an-
nounced to the public that there in fact had been no "measured undercount." This char-
acterization was misleading, however, as the Bureau had reason to know. See notes 103-
04 and accompanying text infra. 
65. See pt. ill infra. 
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ous suits;68 unlike the claims made in earlier years, and unlike 
the funding question, the vote-dilution argument was firmly 
rooted in the Constitution, making the 1980 challenges far more 
difficult to dismiss. 
The vote-dilution argument actually comprised three different 
claims that varied markedly in force. The first was that a large 
undercount would affect voters in different states differently; 
the second was that undercounts would affect voters in different 
congressional districts within a state differently; and the third 
was that voters in different state legislative districts would be 
affected differently. 
The first claim was advanced in New York, where plaintiffs 
argued that the immense undercount would cost the state a con-
gressional representative. This argument, which implied a com-
plete denial of the right to vote, drew support from the literal 
language of article I and suggested a clear violation of the Elec-
toral College arrangement.67 
The second claim was advanced in Young, where it was argued 
that congressional districting within Michigan would be imper-
missibly skewed by disproportionate undercounting of minority 
areas. This claim, although ultimately faithful to the spirit of 
the Supreme Court's reapportionment cases, was vulnerable for 
a host of reasons. In particular, the Constitution imposes no ex-
plicit requirement upon the states that they apportion congres-
sional representatives among districts.88 Similarly, the Constitu-
tion does not· obligate the Census Bureau to compile intrastate 
data, or to make it available for districting purposes. 69 And 
finally, even if states do apportion their representatives, and 
even if the Bureau does compile intrastate data, the states are 
66. See notes 4-7, 11 and accompanying text supra. See generally Note, supra note 
54. 
67. See notes 27-28 supra. 
68. Until 1842 there was no requirement - constitutional or statutory - that states 
distribute their representatives among districts. Most states elected representatives from 
the state as a whole. See Celler, Congressional Apportionment - Past, Present, and 
Future, 17 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 268, 272-75 (1952). Districting is now a federal statu-
tory requirement, 2 U.S.C. § 2 (1976), but the Supreme Court has found it not to be 
required by the Constitution. Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1933); accord, Norton v. 
Campbell, 359 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 839 (1967). Especially in 
recent years, however, the Supreme Court often has discouraged the use of multimember 
districts. Nonetheless, the Court has often commented that multi.member districts are 
not prohibited by the Constitution. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65-66 
(1980), and cases cited therein. 
69. The sub-state population figures that states use to apportion their representatives 
are compiled by the Census Bureau only because of statutory requirement, 13 U.S.C. 
§ 14l(c)(l977), not constitutional mandate. 
,/ 
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not required by the Constitution to use that intrastate data in 
drawing up their districting plans.70 Given these factors, it would 
seem hard to argue that the Bureau has a constitutional obliga-
tion to adjust the data for undercounts when it does supply 
intrastate data to the states. 
Though that argument may be flawed in its logic, it is con- . 
vincing in the context of Supreme Court decisions. In Wesberry 
v. Sanders71 and succeeding congressional reapportionment 
cases,72 the Supreme Court mandated that states must "make a 
good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality"73 in 
the size of voting districts when promulgating congressional dis-
tricting plans. In a 1973 case,7'' for example, the Supreme Court 
rejected a congressional districting plan in Texas that involved 
average deviations of less than one percent between districts,711 
substituting in its place a plan in which districts only varied in 
size from 466,930 to 466,234 people.78 Once the Census Bureau is 
70. Contrary to the district court's finding in Young that census data must be used 
for districting plans, 497 F. Supp. at 1333, the Supreme Court has suggested that the 
Constitution might tolerate apportionment based, for example, on totals of eligible vot-
ers. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 534-35 (1969)("There may be a question 
whether distribution of Congressional seats except according to total population can ever 
be permissible under Art. I, § 2. But assuming without deciding that apportionment may 
be based on eligible voter population rather than total population, the Missouri plan is 
still unacceptable .... "). See also Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Borough of 
Bethel Park v. Stans, 449 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1971); Shalvoy v. Curran, 393 F.2d 55 (2d 
Cir. 1968); Dixon v. Hassler, 412 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Re-
publican Party of Shelby County v. Dixon, 429 U.S. 934 (1976); Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F. 
Supp. 603 (D. Neb. 1967); Meeks v. Avery, 251 F. Supp. 245 (D. Kan. 1966). In each of 
these cases, the courts authorized or mandated use of non-census population data for 
reapportionment. Generally, however, the courts have presumed that census figures are 
the most suitable. See, e.g., Dixon v. Hassler, 412 F. Supp. at 1040 ("we believe that the 
standard to be applied is that the decennial census figure,s will be controlling unless 
there is 'clear, cogent and convincing evidence' that they are no longer valid and that 
other figures are valid"). 
71. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
72. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973). 
73. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969). 
74. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973). 
75. The districts in the rejected plan ranged from 477,856 to 458,581 people, with an 
average deviation of 3,421 people (or 0.745%). 
76. See also Dunnell v. Austin, 344 F. Supp. 210 (E.D. Mich. 1972), discussed in note 
50 supra, in which a Michigan district court adopted a plan apportioning that state's 19 
congressional districts so precisely that no district varied by more than 8 people from the 
"ideal district size" of 467,543. 
· The astounding mathematical precision mandated in these apportionment cases is par-
adoxical given the acknowledged census undercounts. If Detroit was actually under-
counted by 67,000 people in 1970, as the Young plaintiff's estimated, Brief for Plaintiff's-
Appellees at 3, 652 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1981), it may be wondered why the Dunnell court 
should have strained to ensure that Michigan's districts be precisely equal. The Supreme 
Court has recognized this paradox. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745-46 
(1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 539 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring); Wells v. 
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considered as a matter of law to be causing reapportionment in-
accuracies, as the Bureau unquestionably is doing as a matter of 
fact, then it makes sense to recognize the Bureau's constitu-
tional duty to correct these inaccuraci,es.77 
The third and final claim based on voting-rights dilution arose 
in connection with state legislative districts. As in the case of 
congressional districts, the Detroit and New York plaintiffs ar-
gued that unadjusted census :figures must be corrected if they 
produce impermissible deviations in district sizes. This argu-
ment is even more vulnerable than the congressional districting 
argument, because the Sµpreme Court has expressly allowed 
states to use non-population-based data, including lists of eligi-
ble voters, for apportionment of legislative districts.78 In addi-
tion, the Court has been more tolerant of any resulting devia-
tions when legislative rather than congressional districts are 
involved. 79 
Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 555 (1969) (White, J., concurring) ("Today's decisions ... 
require precise adherence to admittedly inexact census figures."). 
An even greater irony of the undercount suits is presented by the prospect that relief 
will not be awarded in those cases simply because it is administratively infeasible. This is 
ironic because the rights that are being asserted in those suits - which stem from the 
premise that mathematical precision in apportionment is mandatory - originated be-
cause mathematical rigidity promised to provide an easily administrable solution to a 
political problem that seemed impossibly complicated. See, e.g., Dixon, Reapportion· 
ment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representa· 
tion, 63 Mien. L. REv. 209, 210 (1964)("by its exclusive focus on bare numbers, the Court 
may have transformed one of' the most intricate, fascinating, and elusive problems of 
democracy into a simple exercise of applying elementary arithmetic to census data"). 
77. See notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra. 
78. See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91-92 (1966). 
The Court has left open the question whether non-population-based data can be used 
for congressional districting. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 534-35 (1969). 
The distinction between the standards applied to congressional districting plans and 
those applied to state legislative plans stems from the difference between the constitu-
tional provisions used to justify judicial supervision in these two areas. The Supreme 
Court built its "one person-one vote" doctrines for congressional apportionment upon 
the language of article I of the Constitution. See note 27 supra. Because that provision 
refers only to distribution for the House of Representatives, the Court turned to the 
equal protection clause when it developed similar equal districting doctrines for state 
and local districting plans. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Avery v. Mid-
land County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), the Court interpreted the equal protection clause to 
require that state apportionlllent statutes not have unequal effects on the voting rights 
of citizens. 
79. At first, it was unclear whether the Supreme Court would apply the same stan-
dard of precise mathematical equality to legislative districting as it was requiring with 
congressional districting. But in 1973, with several justices from the earlier voting rights 
cases off the bench, the Supreme Court ruled that population disparities of as much as 
16.4% would be tolerated if justified by legitimate state policy considerations. See Ma-
han v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973). These considerations included allowing the represen• 
tation of political subdivisions as legislative units, maintaining compact and contiguous 
districts, and preserving natural or historical boundary lines. See Swann v. Adams, 385 
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Even with regard to legislative apportionment, however, there 
remains a strong argument for requiring census adjustments if 
they are possible. Given that virtually all states use census data 
for apportionment, once again the real issue is whether the Bu-
reau should be considered responsible in legal terms for the in-
accuracies it produces in fact. If so, the deviations that result 
often may be large enough to exceed even the Supreme Court's 
relaxed standards for legislative districts. 80 
2. Loss of government funds- The role of undercounts in 
depriving areas of government funds was largely ignored once 
the census cases reached the courtrooms.81 Both the district 
court in Young82 and the District of Columbia panel in the ille-
gal aliens case88 adopted a restrictive view of causation by ruling 
that the plaintiffs could seek relief on their funding claims only 
from Congress or state legislatures.M The New York courts, on 
the other hand, again took a more realistic stance, recognizing 
that Census Bureau figures often were responsible for significant 
funding losses. 85 While the effect of an undercount on funding • 
U.S. 440, 444 (1967). 
Later that year, the Court declared that even districting plans that contained un-
explained 9.9% deviations were permissible, because those deviations were "relatively 
minor." White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 765, 764 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 
(1973). 
80. For example, if the undercount in New York City was in fact as high as 517,000 
to 650,000 people, Carey v. Klutznick, 608 F. Supp. at 428, then because that undercount 
would have occurred with disproportionate strength in certain racial and socioeconomic 
neighborhoods, any legislative districting in New York City based on census figures 
might well involve disparities of at least the 9.9% "de minimus" deviations sanctioned in 
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
Cf. City's Population Loss Is Put at One Million; 13.8% Drop Since '70, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 26, 1980, at 1, col. 2 (preliminary census figures show New York City's population 
at 6,808,370 people). But see Note, supra note 65, at 861 ("It would be surprising if any 
plaintiffs were able to show that an undercount violated these more relaxed standards."). 
Moreover, it is conceivable that no deviations rooted in correctable undercounts 
should be tolerated. The Court has specifically noted that it will not accept any devia-
tions that reflect "any taint of arbitrariness of discrimination." Roman v. Sincock, 377 
U.S. 695, 710 (1964), quoted in Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, at 444 (1967). Failure to 
correct census figures suggests the arbitrary and indefensible dilution of voting rights -
especially those belonging to poor people and minorities - about which the Court has 
often been particularly concerned. 
81. There is no discussion of this issue, for example, in the New York trial opinion, 
even though the Second Circuit explicitly affirmed as a valid cause of action plaintiffs' 
claims that they would lose funding. Carey v. Klutznick, 637 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir. 1980). 
82. Young v. Klutznick, No. 71330 (E.D. Mich., motion to dismiss denied May 29, 
1980); see note 18 supra. 
83. FAIR v. Klutznick, supra note 3, at 569 n.9. 
84. "While Congress may well be distributing federal monies on the basis of undiffer-
entiated population figures, that is its choice. • • • Congress may choose any method of 
allocation it prefers, subject only to the constraints of the rational relationship test." Id. 
85. See notes 46 & 54 supra. If the Bureau's mismanagement and undercount policies 
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may vary from year to year and area to area, 88 the Second Cir-
cuit noted that undercounts of the New York area can easily 
produce multimillion dollar losses.87 This result is especially un-
fortunate because many of these funding programs have been 
designed to benefit the very groups who tend to be missed.ss 
Thus, both in constitutional theory and in political reality the 
arguments for census adjustments seem strongly persuasive. 
III. THE PROBLEM OF REMEDY IN THE CENSUS SUITS 
In the initial census skirmishes, the one issue that virtually 
never surfaced was whether "statistically defensible" undercount 
adjustments were even possible. The issue was overlooked be-
cause the Bureau devoted most of its efforts toward arguing that 
the Constitution actually barred census adjustments.s9 That 
produced a misallocation of funds, that should have provided a sufficient causal link to 
support standing. See Carey v. Klutznick, 637 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'g 508 F. Supp. 
404 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); City of Philadelphia v. Klutznick, 503 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Pa. 1980); 
City of Camden v. Plotkin, 466 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1978). 
One commentator has contended that "there is no [convincing] argument that congres-
sional intent is being violated by a failure to prepare or use adjusted data" because 
"Congress has recognized the undercounting problem but, with one exception, has not 
ordered the use or production of adjusted statistics." Note, supra note 65, at 863. That 
inference, if true, would seriously weaken the funding claim by suggesting that the cen-
sus challengers may have no cognizable right to greater funding. But see 13 U.S.C. §§ 
14l(e), 18l(a), 183(a) (1976) (authorizing or requiring development of updated popula-
tion data during the intervals between censuses for use, among other purposes, in dis-
tributing government benefits). See generally Note, supra note 11 (describing the con-
siderable congressional concern expressed over the last decade with the problem of 
undercounts). 
86. See note 42 supra. 
87. Carey v. Klutznick, 637 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir. 1980}. In 1979, Queens Borough 
President Donald R. Manes testified before a congressional committee that in the previ-
ous year, for example, New York City had lost $32 million alone from the four major 
federal funding programs because of failure to include 750,000 illegal aliens in area popu-
lation totals. 1979 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 28. But see note 42 supra. 
88. Census statistics now provide the basis for distributing federal funds under more 
than one hundred programs. See SuucoMM. ON CENSUS AND POPULATION OF THE House 
CoMM. ON PosT OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, 95TH CoNG., 2D SESs., THE Use OF POPULATION 
DATA IN FEDERAL AsSISTANCE PROGRAMS (Comm. Print 1978). 
89. The constitutional provision authorizing the census is found in article I: "The 
actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting; .• and 
within every subsequent Term of ten Years •••• " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The 
Bureau argued that, in requiring an "actual Enumeration," the Constitution prohibited 
statistical adjustments. But both the Young and Carey courts, after reviewing debates 
from the Constitutional Convention of 1789, as well as the Supreme Court's opinions in 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), con-
cluded that the Constitution required accuracy in the census data, not any particular 
method. 
178 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 15:1 
claim was patently .untenable, however, because the Bureau it-
self had adjusted the 1970 census to add 4.9 million of the 10.2 
million it estimated were uncounted.80 
The Bureau's arguments during the early census battles may 
have reflected undue confidence;01 in any event, the agency 
clearly seemed unprepared for the Detroit trial opinion en-
joining release of final figures until national adjustments had 
been made. Within weeks, the agency began arguing seriously in 
post-trial reports92 and in testimony at the New York trial that 
such adjustments were infeasible. But the trial courts, perhaps 
skeptical about the Bureau's motives in making this argument,113 
continued to order it to develop adjustment plans whose precise 
features were left to the agency's discretion. While the courts' 
skepticism may have been understandable, their orders did not 
solve the dilemma of what relief they should give if the Bureau 
was right. Ultimately, this seems to have been the case; appar-
ently there were no "s~tistically defensible" adjustment 
techniques. 
A. Standard Adjustment Methods94 
The following sections evaluate the three principal adjustment 
methods the Bureau could have used. Each method has its 
strengths, but all have daunting weaknesses. The paradoxical 
outcome for the census challengers may well have been that al-
though their rights were acknowledged at trial, ultimately no 
remedy was available to vindicate those rights. 
90. See Young v. Klutznick, 497 F. Supp. at 1329. While the Bureau decided not to 
adjust its final figures to include 6.3 million people that it estimated were uncounted, the 
agency nevertheless had "imputed" the existence of certain groups of people, including 
some "when the Bureau did not have hard evidence . • • that they even existed in the 
quantity imputed." Given these imputations in 1970, the district court in Young found it 
"astonishing" that the Bureau would argue in 1980 that such adjustments were unconsti-
tutional. Id. 
The Bureau currently estimates that it only missed 4.5 million people in 1970 - not 
including the 4.9 million it missed but "imputed." Federal Register Statement, supra 
note 5. 
91. See note 11 and accompanying text supra. 
92. See note 21 and accompanying text supra. See also Census Bureau Seeks to Ap· 
peal Court Decision Invalidating 1980 Census, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1980, at 6, col 1 
("Mr. Barabba [the head of the Census Bureau] said that it was important to appeal 
promptly because the judge in the Detroit case, Horace W. Gilmore, 'has, in essence, 
changed the rules of the ballgame'."). 
93. See note 64 supra. 
94. This section relies extensively on N. Y. Bar Report, supra note 4; 1977 CENSUS 
REPORT, supra note 5; and Federal Register Statement, supra note 5. 
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1. Demographic records- Under the "simple synthetic 
method,,, the Census Bureau first estimates separate cross-
sections of the nation's population, using demographic data such 
as birth, death, immigration, and Medicare records. After the 
census has been taken, the Bureau then compares the estimates 
derived from these demographic sources with the actual 
headcounts and adjusts the final figures accordingly. If estimates 
indicate that the Bureau undercounted blacks by seven percent, 
for example, the final figures for blacks can be adjusted up-
wardly by that amount. By "synthesizing" the estimates with 
the raw data, the Bureau can quickly produce adjusted totals of 
greater accuracy than either the estimates or the actual 
headcount. 
The synthetic method, although speedy, presents two major 
problems. First, its estimates may not be accurate for making 
precise adjustments in legislative or congressional districts. It 
may have been true, for example, that in 1980, as in 1970, nearly 
thirteen percent of black males nationwide between twenty-five 
and thirty-four years of age were uncounted.95 But that informa-
tion has only limited usefulness, because it seems likely that the 
undercount of black men varied markedly between the inner city 
of Detroit and its well-to-do suburb of Southfield.98 
Second, the synthetic method is only as accurate as the demo-
graphic records used to make the initial estimates. Thus, the 
Bureau may overestimate the population - when, for example, 
it uses records that include the same people twice under variant 
spellings of their names. In addition, the Bureau may be left 
with flatly inconsistent estimates - because, for instance, His-
panics may list themselves in demographic data as "white" or 
"of other races" at different times.97 And most important, the 
Bureau may underestimate the population-when it not only 
lacks demographic· records on illegal aliens, for example, but also 
never counts them, and thus never knows they were missed. 
2. Matching population lists- Instead of using demo-
graphic data, the Bureau alternatively can match the names on 
census lists with those on other contemporaneous lists - from 
Medicare, Internal Revenue Service, or welfare files, for example 
- and develop estimates about the extent to which different 
95. 1977 CENSUS REPORT, supra note 5, at 43. 
96. See Note, supra note 11, at 251-52 nn.183-84 (doubts about the validity of the 
synthetic method are "appropriate," especially when local adjustments are sought). 
97 N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 4, at 28 ("Pretests for the 1980 census showed that 
as many as 40 percent of the respondents of Hispanic origin characterized themselves as 
'other races,' while in the demographic data Hispanics are characterized as 'whites'."). 
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groups in the population were missed. This method is more pre-
cise than the synthetic method because it involves matching ac-
tual names. Thus, the inconsistency problems of the synthetic 
method that arise in counting Hispanics, for instance, would be 
largely remedied. Furthermore, this approach enables lists to be 
corrected when people have been included in the wrong areas or 
made up by census workers.98 
Matching studies, however, do not provide a perfect solution 
to the undercount adjustment problem. Such studies require 
massive lists of names if precise local estimates are to be made. 
They are thus very time-consuming, because they require ad-
justers to work name-by-name and investigate discrepancies "in 
the field." Furthermore, matching studies rarely count illegal 
aliens, unless the aliens have signed up for social services. Fi-
nally, because these studies require the extensive use of detailed 
individual information, they generate considerable anxiety and 
litigation over the secrecy of census files.99 
3. Composite statistical techniques- In addition to 
straightforward use of demographic data or matching lists to 
make adjustments, the Bureau has alsd designed a host of ap-
proaches that combine these simpler methods to produce in-
creasingly sophisticated estimates. For example, one composite 
technique involves adjusting demographic estimates of men of 
certain ages by match study ratios based on estimates of the un-
dercounting of women. The latter estimates are considered more 
reliable than estimates of the undercounting of men. Other com-
posite techniques are used to produce improved estimates of 
Hispanic populations, for example, or the more precise adjust-
ments that statistical regression analysis can provide. 
The two greatest problems of composite techniques are that 
they are predictably more time-consuming than the simpler 
methods, and they are not markedly more effective in estimating 
illegal aliens. These latter problems lie at the heart of the ulti-
98. See note 62 supra. 
99. See note 40 supra. The confidentiality concerns were expressed poignantly during 
an exchange between Senator John Glenn and Reverend Riddick, chairman of an advi-
sory committee on the black population for the Census Bureau: 
SENATOR GLENN: (W]e were told the Census Bureau has a problem because 
some people don't want to be counted. Why don't they want to be counted? It is 
to their benefit to be counted. 
REVEREND RIDDICK: [S]pying on people's lives and everything like that is a 
very real part of the existence they have and so they are very intimidated by the 
census. 
Many people have the image of the census as Big Brother, you know, made 
manifest .•.. 
1979 Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 250. 
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mate impossibility of granting relief in the undercount cases. 
B. The Delay Required in Making Adjustments 
Not surprisingly, the most accurate and detailed undercount 
adjustments take the most time. For example, the Census Bu-
reau has already released preliminary national estimates of the 
undercount of blacks, Hispanics, and people from other racial 
backgrounds. But the most reliable, most detailed state and lo-
cal adjustments will not be available before 1984.100 
This timetable creates tremendously complex problems for 
courts trying to develop remedies. Simply in terms of reappor-
tionment, and without trying to address loss-of-funding claims, 
there are the following dilemmas: 
• Should courts require reapportionment only after several 
years, when the Bureau releases its best undercount estimates? 
Or should they act earlier, when the Bureau first releases its ini-
tial estimates based on less reliable statistics and methods? 
• Should courts allow state reapportionment to proceed with 
:figures that have not yet been adjusted, while requiring the use 
of any prelimh:iary national corrections that are available (so 
that New York State, for example, might get an additional con-
gressional representative)? 
• Should courts have required reapportionment when the Bu-
reau was scheduled to release its estimates for the largest cities 
and metropolitan areas in late 1981, and then require another 
reapportionment when the most detailed adjustments become 
available in 1983 or 1984?101 
Faced with these bewildering riddles, it is understandable 
that the appellate courts in New York and Detroit declined to 
affirm the lower court rulings. The appellate courts simply were 
100. Although national estimates of the undercount of blacks, Hispanics, and other 
races derived from demographic records and 1978 match studies were released in Febru-
ary, 1981, the most precise national estimates will not be available until mid-1983. Pre-
liminary undercount estimates for states, using a match study conducted at the time of 
the 1980 census, were to be available by the fall of 1981. Again, however, the best com-
posite state estimates will not be available until late 1983 or early 1984. Finally, prelimi-
nary estimates for major cities and Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas were to be 
available in the fall of 1981. The best estimates, however, involving experimental com-
posite techniques and regression analysis, will not be available until 1984. 
101. A final source of controversy is presented by the 1985 mid-decennial census, 
which Congress has authorized for the first time in the nation's history. See 13 U.S.C. § 
141(d) (1976). While Congress has made clear that this census is not to be used for con-
gressional reapportionment, id. § 141(e)(2), it has provided that funding may be adjusted 
in accordance with the new figures, id. § 141(e){l). 
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stymied by the same dilemmas that had prevented either Con-
gress or the executive branch from resolving the undercount 
problems themselves. 
C. The Illegal Alien Issues 
In the end, the greatest irony of the 1980 census challenges 
was that no official undercount occurred at all. In the Detroit 
trial in August 1980; Bureau Director Barabba testified that his 
agency estimated the nation's population at 227 million and had 
expected to count 222 million.102 But by December 1980, the Bu-
reau had in fact counted 226 million people; after adjusting 
faulty assumptions about immigration in the 1970's, it an-
nounced there was no "measured undercount."108 
The Bureau's statements, however, were more than a little 
misleading.10' There clearly was a significant undercount in the 
population of legal residents, as observers had expected. The 
complication was that the Bureau had compensated by counting 
several million illegal aliens. Because few of· those aliens had 
been included in the Bureau's estimates, for few had birth, 
Medicare, or IRS records, a new panoply of adjustment 
problems arose. The counting of illegal aliens raised problems at 
the outset because the Bureau had virtually no way of knowing 
which illegal aliens had been counted or where they were - or 
for that matter, which illegal aliens had not been counted or 
where they were.105 Furthermore, the inclusion of unanticipated 
102. 497 F. Supp. at 1330. 
103. Census Bureau Bars Shift in '80 Figures/Director Says He Is Convinced the 
· 226 Million Total Counted Is Close to Real Population, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1980, at 
17, col. l; Federal Register Statement, supra note 5 (statement of Bureau's decision not 
to adjust the undercount, published in the Dec. 16, 1980 Federal Register). 
104. Though the Bureau was fully candid in its official statements, see Federal Regis-
ter Statement, supra note 5, there is a strong suggestion that the Bureau knew it was 
being deceptive in adopting the artifice of a "measured undercount." See Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum on the Tape Recordings of the October 16-17, 1980, Conference at the 
Bureau of the Census at 5-7, Carey v. Klutznick, 508 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). And 
to some extent, the Bureau was successful; among those fooled were the New York 
Times editorial staff. See Clouds Over the Census, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1980, at 14, col. 
1 ("This year, the estimate was 226 million and the actual count appeara to be very close 
to just that figure; the undercount is likely to be small."). 
Other observers were not misled - the Carey trial court, for example, refeued dryly 
to the phrase "measured undercount" as "a term of recent vintage." 508 F. Supp. at 427. 
And some others were amused. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 42, at 15 ("Senator George 
Aiken secured his place in history by proposing that we end the Vietnam War by simply 
declaring victory and going home. The US Census Bureau, mired in a similar quagmire 
late last year, adopted the Aiken strategy. And it worked .••. ") 
105. "No estimate of the size of the illegal alien population exists which is accepted 
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aliens created the related problem of not knowing whether the 
states involved in the undercount suits were actually the ones 
most affected by the national undercount. Some observers have 
suggested, for example, that the states most injured by the na-
tional undercount were not, with the exception of New York, the 
northeastern states, but rather the sunbelt states of Texas, Ari-
zona, and California where most illegal aliens live.108 
Most important, the census process highlighted the problem 
of whether illegal aliens should be counted at all. This question 
was raised before one court in the last months before the 1980 
census, but that court refused to recognize standing - perhaps 
because the question was so complex that the court thought it 
deserved greater attention.107 The court explicitly noted that its 
disposition did not foreclose the raising of the question again, 
and the serious constitutional ramifications certainly suggest 
that the issue will be addressed in the future. 108 
IV. PROBLEMS UNRESOLVED BY THE 1980 CENSUS CASES 
Although the Bureau had not focused in the Detroit or New 
York trials on the staggering complexities of the illegal alien is-
sues, their appearance must have been the final blow to any 
prospects the · census challengers had. With the emergence of 
these problems, the chances of obtaining any coherent relief -
already diminished by the uncertainties of knowing which ad-
justments to make - dropped to zero. 
At the same time, these complexities of framing a remedy put 
the appellate courts in a difficult position. Despite the agency's 
failure to raise the defense of infeasibility earlier in the proceed-
ings, the courts could hardly have required the Bureau to go 
through the motions of adjusting the census. Given this situa-
as accurate or based on hard data." FAIR v. Klutznick, supra note 3, at 567 n.6. Though 
estimates of the nation's illegal alien population extend as high as 8 to 12 million, 1979 
House Hearings, supra note 7, at 22-23, the Bureau's best estimate is 3.5 to 5 million. 
FAIR v. Klutznick, supra note 3, at 567 n.6. The New York City Planning Commission 
has estimated that city's illegal alien population to be at minimum 750,000, though the 
Bureau disputes that figure. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 23, 27-28. 
106. Blum, supra note 42, at 15-16 ("The people who should be complaining most 
haven't raised the slightest objection to the 1980 Census. They are the mayors of cities 
like Austin, Texas, and Tucson, Arizona, where illegal aliens flowed during the last dec-
ade without attracting the Census Bureau's notice."). 
107. FAIR v. Klutznick, supra note 3, at 577. 
108. See, e.g., note 19 supra, exploring the distinction between a right to have one's 
vote count, which illegal aliens do not have, and a right to be represented or to be 
counted, which illegal aliens may have. 
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tion, the courts should have acknowledged openly that the cases 
had changed since their inception and now defied relief. Unfor-
tunately, the courts seem to have chosen a different approach. 
After each wrestling with the trial court opinions for a half a 
year or more, 109 the Sixth and Second Circuits dismissed the 
suits on grounds that seem remarkably disingenuous. 
At least two important benefits would have resulted from the 
former, more candid resolution of the undercount cases. First, 
the courts could have avoided manipulating the law of their ju-
risdictions in a way that encourages cynicism today, while tying 
the hands of courts tomorrow who may be determined to re-
strain their decisions within intelligible precedent. The Sixth 
Circuit's decision on standing grounds was especially unfortu-
nate, for example, and can only befoul an already murky doctri-
nal area. 
Had the appellate rulings been based on impracticality 
grounds, a second advantage would have been that the courts 
could have taken the opportunity to address the public values at 
stake in the census cases.110 If one principal role of the judiciary, 
particularly in public law cases, is to give meaning to constitu-
tional values, 111 then the courts missed an important opportu-
nity to fulfill their responsibilities. They should have pointed 
out that undercounts not only directly threaten rights to partici-
pate in the democratic decisionmaking process, but also frus-
trate a societal goal of redistributing resources to the nation's 
minority and underprivileged residents.112 In declining to affirm 
109. Despite the considerable time pressures created by the reapportionment process, 
it took nearly seven months for the Second Circuit to rule in Carey, and nearly nine 
months for the Sixth Circuit to rule in Young. Interestingly, the appellate rulings came 
within days of each other. See Court Overturns Census Decision in New York Suit, N.Y. 
Times, June 13, 1981, at 27, col. 1; Appeals Court Upsets Order to Raise Census Total, 
N.Y. Times, June 16, 1981, at 16, col. 1. 
110. The Sixth Circuit was candid about its approach. See Young v. Klutznick, 652 
F.2d 617,625 n.8 (6th Cir. 1981)("Obviously there are many unjust conditions and occur-
rences, natural and man-made, which federal courts do not have the strength, wisdom or 
power to remedy in a timely manner. When there is no realistic remedy available, there 
is no point in deciding the merits."). 
111. See Fiss, supra note 48, at 9 ("The task of the judge is to give meaning to con-
stitutional values, and he does that by working with the constitutional text, history, and 
social ideals."). See generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Under· 
standing, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental 
Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978); Linde, Judges, 
Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 254 (1972). 
112. See J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). The voting rights injuries com-
plained of in the census challenges raise concerns that are "what judicial review ought 
preeminently to be about." Id. at 117. On one hand, the challenges were well-rooted in 
specific clauses of the Constitution's text. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra. 
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these values, the courts instead sent the message that those val-
ues - at least in this context - perhaps are not so important 
after all. 113 
Yet while the 1980 census may have receded into history, the 
challenges heard in 1980 are likely to surface again as the na-
tion's first mid-decennial census approaches in 1985.114 The 
creation of a mid-decennial census only underscores the nation's 
increasing concern that its resources and political power be dis-
tributed equally. Given these awesome tasks, it is hard to justify 
failure to make every reasonable effort toward developing popu-
lation figures that are as complete as possible. 
Unfortunately, the 1980 undercount challenges made clear 
that the Census Bureau's management techniques be·ar watching 
with some concern. At the same time, however, it seems likely 
that wholly accurate headcounts will never be possible.1115 In-
deed, some have argued that the nation already wastes vast 
sums in its quixotic attempts to eliminate census undercounts. 118 
The suggestion that undercounts can be corrected seems to be a 
In addition, the merits of the census suits are further underscored when one e;ic:amines 
the Constitution's purposes. For even if, as Professor Ely contends, "judicial review 
under the Constitution's open-ended provisions" is bounded "by insisting that it can 
appropriately concern itself only with questions of participation [in the democratic pro-
cess], and not with the substantive merits of the political choice under attack," id. at 
181, nonetheless, "denial of the vote seems the quintessential stoppage" of the demo-
cratic process, id. at 117. 
113. See Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional 
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1220 (1978) ("as a general matter, the scope of a constitu-
tional norm is considered to be coterminous with the scope of judicial enforcement"). 
The census challenges powerfully illustrate Professor Sager's suggestion that where con-
stitutional norms are not enforced for institutional reasons, as opposed to analytical diffi-
culties, the "underenforced" norms should still be expressed and "understood to be le-
gally valid to their full conceptual limits." Id. at 1221. Not only should the societal 
values raised in the census cases be championed generally for future constitutional adju-
dication, but the Bureau also should be made aware of the necessity that it make all 
possible efforts to reduce undercounts. 
Public officials cannot consider themselves free to act at what they perceive or 
ought to perceive to be peril to constitutional norms merely because the federal 
judiciary is unable to enforce these norms at their margins. At a minimum, the 
obligation of public officials in this context, as in ruiy other, is one of "best 
efforts" to avoid unconstitutional conduct. 
Id. at 1227. 
114. See note 101 supra. 
115. See generally note 62 supra. For many, the census is intimidating or intrusive, 
see note 99 supra, and is likely to be resisted. For others, the census may simply be 
irrelevant, and unlikely to gain their cooperation. See, e.g., the exchange between 
Senator Glenn and Mayor Barry, supra note 62. 
116. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Arnold P. Jones, 
Assoc. Dir., Gen. Gov. Div., GAO) ("Our [November] 1978 report shows that the Bureau 
plans to spend more than four times the $222 million it spent for the 1970 census, with-
out assurance that there will be an appreciable improvement in the data collected."). 
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false hope; at least with the present technology, reliable methods 
of adjusting for undercounts do not appear to exist. 
Thus, Congress and the courts should be alert to the dangers 
of simplistic or intensely politicized "corrections." The integrity 
of the census process should not be at the mercy of which cities 
care or can afford to sue,117 which minorities are able to estab-
lish injury, or which federal judges have the courage - or the 
foolhardiness - to confront the census bureaucracy. 
Even so, however, the methods used by Congress and the 
courts to protect the census process should be undisguised; the 
public values threatened by undercounts deserve to be ad-
dressed openly. That these values cannot always be defended in 
an unruly world may be unfortunate. But rather than tailoring 
the rights of the census challengers by judicial manipulation, 118 
or finding clever ways to change the subject when their concerns 
are raised, the courts will better protect societal values if they 
frankly acknowledge that the claims must go unvindicated be-
cause no relief can be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Significant census undercounts, such as those occurring in 
1980, threaten to undermine the nation's commitment to dis-
tribute political power and resources equally. But undercounts 
cannot be easily adjusted, and the 1980 suits to correct the cen-
sus foundered on doubts that effective relief could be obtained. 
On one hand, these issues will diminish in coming years, as im-
117. See New York Finding 'Pro Bono· Costly, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1981, at 20, col. 1 
(midw. ed.) (describing $384,245 bill for "out of pocket" expenses submitted to New 
York City in the Carey suit by its pro bono counsel, a Wall Street firm. "Had the firm 
actually charged the city for the hours its attorneys put in to date, it maintains, the bill 
would be $1,865,132."). 
118. Professor Fiss, discussing how courts may shape remedies in cases involving 
public bureaucracies so as to ensure that the relief can be implemented and enforced, 
writes: 
The remedy is, as we saw, a vitally important part of the meaning of the public 
value, and even if the remedy were all that were affected, all that were compro-
mised, there would be reason to be concerned. But the truth of the matter is 
that the stakes are likely to be higher - the distortion will be felt in the realm 
of rights, too. Just as it is reasonable to assume that a judge wishes to be effica-
cious, it is also reasonable to assume that no judge is anxious to proclaim his 
impotence. He will strive to lessen the gap between declaration and actualiza-
tion. He will tailor the right to fit the remedies. 
Fiss, supra note 48, at 54-55 (footnote omitted); cf. note 76 supra (discussing how the 
Supreme Court framed the definition of injury in the reapportionment cases around how 
easily remedies could be administered and future litigation minimized). 
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proving technology and methods of conducting the census pro-
vide more complete results. But the difficulties that surfaced in 
1980 in counting certain populations, especially the dilemmas 
surrounding the counting of illegal aliens, likely will persist and 
demand more responsive court attention in the future. 
-David B. Tachau 

